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Enabling the enabler 
Using access to information 
to ensure the right to  
peaceful protest    
The Regulation of Gatherings Act (RGA) places strict guidelines on how to exercise the right to 
protest, with particular emphasis on the submission of a notice of gathering to the responsible 
person within a municipality in terms of sections 2(4) and 3 of the Act. However, municipalities do 
not proactively make the notice of gathering templates available for public use (or may not have 
these at all), and often do not publicise the details of the designated responsible person. To test 
municipalities’ compliance with the RGA, the Legal Resources Centre (LRC) enlisted the help of 
the South African History Archive (SAHA) to submit a series of Promotion of Access to Information 
Act (PAIA) requests to every municipality in South Africa. PAIA requests were also submitted to 
the South African Police Service (SAPS) for records relating to public order policing. The initiative 
aimed to provide these templates and related documents to interested parties as an open source 
resource on the protestinfo.org.za website. The results of these efforts show that compliance with 
the RGA is uneven. This article explores the flaws in the regulatory environment that have led to 
this level of apathy within government, despite the crucial role of the right to protest and the right of 
access to information as enabling rights in our constitutional democracy. An analysis of the full PAIA 
request dataset shows the extent of government’s resistance to facilitating these enabling rights, and 
provides insights into remedial interventions. The article concludes with a series of recommendations, 
which centre on statutory reforms to the RGA and PAIA to ensure appropriate sanction for non-
compliance by government, proactive disclosure of relevant information, and emergency provisions 
allowing curtailed procedural requirements. The intention of the proposed amendments is to 
minimise the possibility that these fundamental, enabling rights might be frustrated.  
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‘If your only tool is a hammer then every 
problem looks like a nail’ – Abraham Maslow
The ‘hammer’ of the apartheid regime was 
secrecy and brute force, applied liberally to 
every uprising against the state. The use of this 
‘hammer’ was enabled through laws such as 
the notorious Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 
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1956,1 which has yet to be repealed.2 Despite 
the existence of suppressive laws, protest was 
used very effectively as a liberation tool during 
the apartheid era.3 Today, protest is not only a 
tool for addressing ongoing social struggles but 
also an empowering constitutional right that is 
used for a variety of causes, such as political 
engagement, demands for free education, and 
simply as a form of political expression.4 It has 
therefore been referred to as an enabling right.5 
It is not the only one; for example, the right of 
access to information is another enabling right.6 
An implication of recognising these enabling 
rights in the Constitution is that people in South 
Africa are empowered to pursue fundamental 
and socio-economic rights through participation 
in an active citizenry. In other words, those 
political rights are there to enable people to 
demand the realisation of other rights.
What happens, though, in a situation where the 
right to protest is heavily dependent on being 
sufficiently enabled by the state, as is required 
by section 7(2) of the Constitution?7 The 
Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 (RGA) 
imposes strict procedural requirements on 
how to exercise the right to protest. Emphasis 
is placed on the submission of a notice of 
gathering in terms of section 3(2) of the RGA to 
the responsible officer in the jurisdiction of the 
municipality in which a gathering is planned.8 
Fulfilling this requirement is predicated on 
being able to access the information necessary 
to enable one to do so. Unfortunately, this 
information – the notice templates and the 
details of the responsible officers – is not 
proactively made available by municipalities, 
which results in protesters’ having to struggle 
to obtain the necessary information.9 By not 
making the information accessible to the public, 
the state is arguably de facto limiting the right 
to protest. 
Where a protest does go ahead, protesters 
should be subject to reasonable and 
proportionate policing responses, which take 
cognisance of the constitutional legitimacy of 
this form of political expression.10 Unfortunately 
this has not been the case, as protests that are 
viewed by the South African Police Service’s 
(SAPS) public order policing (POP) unit as 
disruptive or involving violent elements, are often 
met with heavy-handed dispersal techniques.11 
Furthermore, municipal metropolitan police 
departments have become increasingly involved 
in crowd management and dispersal functions 
during protests, leading to questions about 
the lawfulness of the metropolitan police’s 
involvement in policing protest, and the 
appropriateness of their training. There are no 
statutory or regulatory provisions that allow for 
the metropolitan police to be involved in public 
order policing beyond an initial, ancillary role. 
Despite this fact, the metropolitan police have 
become increasingly involved in actual public 
order policing.12
In addition, little is known about the make and 
model of crowd control weapons used by 
the SAPS POP, or about the training manuals 
that determine how the POP use crowd 
control weapons in assembly management 
situations.13 This information is important, 
because depending on the type and calibre 
of rounds used, severe injury can be caused. 
Consequently, protesters cannot anticipate 
the likely response when protests turn violent, 
and are unable to hold the police to their own 
operational standards.  
Given that the state has not proactively 
provided the kinds of important information 
outlined above, it could be argued that our 
constitutional democracy has inherited the 
‘hammer’ of secrecy and force. In light of 
this perceived culture of police abuse of 
power, the Legal Resources Centre sought to 
interrogate the extent of the state’s fulfilment of 
its constitutional obligation to respect, protect 
and promote the rights contained in section 17 
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of the Constitution. To this end it approached 
the South African History Archive to assist with 
requests for information, to be submitted under 
the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 
2000 (PAIA). PAIA requests were submitted in 
two phases, during the latter half of 2016 and 
the first quarter of 2017.14 
In the first phase, PAIA requests were submitted 
to the SAPS and to eight metropolitan 
municipalities (metros). Requests that were 
submitted to the SAPS related primarily to the 
POP unit’s equipment, training and standard 
operating procedures. Requests submitted 
to the metros focused on the increasing 
presence of the various metropolitan police 
departments in crowd management operations, 
as mentioned above, and sought to explore 
whether they were lawfully authorised to 
participate in crowd management operations 
beyond ancillary support, based on the 
provisions contained in the RGA and National 
Instruction 4 of 2014.15 Phase one requests 
therefore sought information about the 
existence of regulations that allowed metro 
police departments to engage in public order 
policing, and about the kind of equipment they 
used and the training they received.
In the second phase, PAIA requests were 
submitted to every municipality in South Africa 
where an information officer’s contact details 
could be found. For a protest to be legally 
convened in South Africa, the RGA requires 
the convener of the gathering to give written 
notice to the relevant responsible officer.16 
Many municipalities require that this notice 
be provided via a template form, yet do not 
proactively make the templates available for 
public use. In practice, the convener of a 
protest must often jump through hoops to 
obtain a template, ascertain what information 
is required by the municipality in question, 
and find the details of the responsible officer. 
While the RGA does not require the completion 
of a specific form, expediency and good 
relationships with the responsible officer are 
improved by providing notice via the template, 
if one exists. The phase two PAIA requests 
therefore sought the contact details of the 
responsible officers and templates for notice 
in order to provide as many of these as 
possible as an open source resource on the 
protestinfo.org.za website for use by members 
of the public wanting to convene a gathering 
or protest. 
The state’s response to these requests was 
generally underwhelming and indicative of non-
compliance with either or both the RGA and 
PAIA. There is a correlation between people’s 
ability to access the information necessary to 
comply with the procedure for lawful protest, 
and their realisation of the right to protest itself. 
Without access to information enabling the right 
to peaceful protest, the promise of protest as 
a means to catalyse the realisation of social 
justice is frustrated. 
Given these considerations, this article explores 
the flaws in the regulatory environment that 
have allowed this level of apathy to exist within 
government, despite the crucial role of the right 
to protest and the right of access to information 
as enabling rights in our constitutional 
democracy. An analysis of the full PAIA request 
dataset shows the extent of government’s 
resistance to facilitating these enabling 
rights, and provides insights into remedial 
interventions. This article contains a series 
of recommendations, drawn from practical 
experience and centred on statutory reforms 
to the RGA (specifically) and PAIA (incidentally). 
These proposed reforms are geared to ensuring 
appropriate sanction for non-compliance by 
government and holders of the rights so as to 
provide measures to enable proactive disclosure 
of relevant information and emergency 
provisions. The proposed reforms would also 
create a more streamlined procedure, and 
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minimise the possibility that these fundamental, 
enabling rights might be frustrated.
Protest and access to 
information as enabling rights
The right to peaceful protest and the right of 
access to information are important enabling 
rights in South Africa’s constitutional democracy. 
Protest provides politically marginalised people 
with a means to express their dissatisfaction 
and apply pressure on governments to respond 
to their concerns. This is well demonstrated by 
South Africa’s struggle against apartheid, where 
mass mobilisation was a crucial element in the 
matrix of forces that led to the realisation of 
democracy and the protection of fundamental 
rights through the Bill of Rights.
Peaceful assembly, demonstration, picketing, 
and the presentation of petitions are viewed by 
many in South Africa today as the most readily 
accessible means to ensure an accountable 
and responsive government during inter-election 
periods.17 This is due to the fact that section 
17 of the Constitution guarantees ordinary 
people the right to protest, and enables them 
to communicate their dissatisfaction to the 
public and to apply collective pressure on 
government to provide more immediate access 
to fundamental rights.18 
The enabling potential of the various rights 
contained in section 17 is explicitly recognised 
by the Constitutional Court in South African 
Transport and Allied Workers’ Union and Another 
v Garvas and Others.19 The court was called 
upon to determine the constitutionality of section 
11(2) of the RGA, which imposes liability on 
the conveners of a gathering where reasonably 
foreseeable damage to or destruction of property 
is not adequately prevented. The majority per 
Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng held that ‘in 
assessing the nature and importance of the right 
[to protest], we cannot … ignore its foundational 
relevance to the exercise and achievement of all 
other rights’.20 These sentiments were echoed by 
the minority per Justice Chris Jafta, who held that 
‘[it] is through the exercise of each of these rights 
that civil society and other similar groups in our 
country are able to influence the political process, 
labour or business decisions and even matters of 
governance and service delivery’.21
Positioning the right to protest at the core of our 
democracy and the realisation of other rights in 
the Bill of Rights creates a strong presumption 
against unwarranted derogation, and provides a 
strong impetus on the state to actively facilitate 
peaceful protest.22 Government’s regulation 
of protest and levels of assistance to potential 
protesters or conveners must therefore be judged 
in this light. 
The RGA sets out the requirements for lawful 
protest. These requirements include the 
submission of a notice of gathering in terms 
of section 3 of the Act to the responsible 
officer, who is designated under section 2(4)
(a). Even though section 3 does not require 
that the notice be placed on a specific form, 
in practice municipalities frequently require 
that these notices be lodged on their own 
template. Municipalities are therefore arguably 
acting unlawfully and unconstitutionally, as this 
requirement is neither justified in terms of a law of 
general application nor defended under section 
36 of the Constitution. In the absence of access 
to information about how and where to give 
notice, and details of who the responsible officer 
is, potential protesters find it difficult to comply 
with these requirements. Tsoaeli and Others v 
S (Bophelo House) held that the conveners of 
gatherings bear the responsibility of notifying the 
local authority.23 The fact that this information 
is not made proactively and easily accessible, 
hampers conveners’ ability to exercise their 
constitutional rights within the parameters of the 
current legal framework.
The Constitutional Court, in Brümmer v Minister 
for Social Development and Others, held that 
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‘access to information is fundamental to the 
realisation of the rights guaranteed in the Bill of 
Rights’.24 Without access to the information that 
can enable lawful protest, further constitutional 
rights, including the right to bodily integrity 
and the right to life, are in turn imperilled. The 
provision of notice by the conveners of a protest 
serves several purposes, but mainly facilitates 
a response by organs of state. The post-notice 
meetings, which may be called under section 
4(2)(b) of the RGA, help ensure that the state 
responds to the protest action in an appropriate 
manner. This ranges from ensuring adequate 
traffic control to a sufficient police presence. 
Where protesters are unable to provide notice, 
there is a greater likelihood that they will face 
a state response that is ill-considered or fails 
to implement measures such as traffic control, 
meant to ensure that the disruption does not 
cause undue harm.25
The right of access to information held by the 
state, as enshrined in section 32(1)(a) of the 
Constitution, must therefore be treated as 
equally crucial to the full realisation of rights 
in the Bill of Rights, as is the right to protest. 
Unfortunately, evidence gathered through the 
PAIA requests indicates a complete disregard 
by the state of the role of easily accessible 
information in enabling and regulating 
peaceful protest. 
The PAIA requests26
The PAIA requests were submitted in two 
phases, and the results of these requests are 
presented below in tables 1 and 2. Table 1 
shows the number of initial requests that were 
submitted (35 in the initial phase, and 202 in 
the follow-up phase). The remaining columns 
set out the outcomes of these requests. Table 
2 follows the same format, but depicts the 
results of internal appeals that were lodged 
in response to the outcomes from Table 1. 
Overall, the data presented in the tables 
show poor compliance with the statutory 
requirements of PAIA, which not only has a 
negative direct impact on the right to protest 
but also has an ancillary impact on the right of 
access to information. The nuances of these 
results are discussed in further detail below.
Understanding the PAIA 
request statistics  
A striking feature of the outcome of the PAIA 
requests submitted as part of this project was 
No. of 
requests 
submitted
No. of 
transfers in 
full to more 
than one 
body
Requests 
denied 
(excluding 
deemed 
refusals)
Requests 
denied 
through 
deemed 
refusals
No. requests 
access 
granted in 
full
No. requests 
access 
granted in 
part
Phase 1 35 0 8 9 12 6
Phase 2 202 27 1 128 4 42
No. of internal 
appeals 
lodged
No. of 
transfers in full 
to more than 
one body
No. of 
confirmed 
decisions
No. of 
substituted 
new decisions 
for full or part 
release
No. of deemed 
refusals of 
appeals
Phase 1 12 0 1 2 9
Phase 2 135 6 1 15 113
Table 1: Requests submitted and their results
Table 2: Internal appeals lodged and their results
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the number of deemed refusals, both at the 
initial stage and at the appeal stage. A deemed 
refusal occurs when a requestee body does not 
respond to a PAIA request within the statutory 
time frame of 30 days.27 Deemed refusals were 
recorded in both phase one and phase two of 
the request processes, and these findings are 
consistent with general trends in PAIA request 
statistics, as highlighted yearly by the Access 
to Information Network in its shadow reports.28 
The Access to Information Network’s Shadow 
Report for 2017 indicates that this trend 
continues, particularly among municipalities, 
with only 171 of 216 requests being responded 
to within the timeframe set out in the statute.29 
This suggests that the right of access to 
information is not being effectively facilitated by 
municipalities, likely owing to inadequate levels 
of training or capacity in the lower spheres of 
government responsible for enabling the right of 
access to information.30
Where responses were received, they were 
often inadequate. In some cases, these 
responses were so inadequate that they 
resulted in internal appeals being lodged. An 
internal appeal is a process set out in PAIA, 
in terms of which a requester can submit an 
appeal against the decision or deemed decision 
of the information officer of certain state 
requestee bodies.31 The political head of that 
body (for example, the mayor or the Speaker 
in the case of a municipality) then reviews the 
decision of the information officer, who is the 
administrative head of the body, and, in the 
case of a municipality, its municipal manager. 
The relevant authority can either confirm or 
reverse the decision of the information officer. 
In cases where the decision is reversed, the 
relevant authority must indicate whether the new 
decision either grants or denies access, with 
reasons for denial based on provisions in PAIA.32 
Responses received under phase one of the 
project were often contradictory. In some 
instances, one municipality would deny access 
to the records by relying on the mandatory 
protection of safety of individuals and the 
protection of property,33 whereas another 
municipality would release the same records. 
For example, our phase one requests to the 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality and the 
City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (COT) 
were refused, relying on the justification that 
their release would endanger the public. On the 
other hand, the City of Cape Town (COCT), and 
the City of Johannesburg (COJ) metropolitan 
municipalities as well as the SAPS, all released 
the records without any reservation. When this 
inconsistency was pointed out to the COT on 
internal appeal it revised its original decision, and 
released the requested records.
The requests for training manuals revealed that 
some metro police were receiving formal training 
in public order policing from the SAPS. None 
of the released records showed authorisation 
for this training in terms of any statutory or 
regulatory provisions. This implies that the metro 
police are receiving training from the SAPS to act 
beyond their legislated purview, as metro police 
are only mandated by National Instruction 4 to 
be first responders to a spontaneous protest. 
While we recognise that the POP’s resources 
may be limited, which circumscribes its ability to 
respond to all spontaneous protests, there ought 
to be a legislative or regulatory provision guiding 
interventions by metro police at gatherings. 
Without this mandate, there is no way to guide 
expectations as to the extent of involvement of 
metro police officers in policing gatherings. This 
is critical, as National Instruction 4 does not 
sanction metro police to use force at gatherings 
and assemblies, yet they possess and carry 
crowd control weapons.34
Even though PAIA does not expressly require 
record creation, only decisions on access to 
existing records, phase one saw several useful 
documents being created by requestee bodies 
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in response to our requests. For example, 
the SAPS created a spreadsheet containing 
all the authorised members’ contact details 
throughout the country.35 This is an incredibly 
useful tool for potential protest conveners 
and the provision of this information is in 
keeping with the spirit of PAIA, which requires 
an open and transparent approach to the 
management of state affairs. Another example 
was the COJ’s creation of records that detail 
the make and model of the weapons used 
by the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police 
Department, which allows experts to analyse 
the type of weapons being used to police 
protests, and potentially challenge their use 
should they lead to disproportionate harm.36 
The fact that these requestee bodies went the 
extra mile in facilitating access to information is 
commendable and should be an example 
of how to be proactive and facilitate a culture 
of transparency.
Phase two was extremely laborious and entailed 
SAHA’s Freedom of Information Programme 
(FOIP) team manually sourcing the contact 
details of information officers for almost all of 
the municipalities in the country. This was owing 
to the fact that only a handful of municipalities 
have complied with the statutory requirement 
to create a PAIA Manual, which contains 
(among other things) the contact details of the 
information officer for the public body, and to 
make this manual accessible from a website.37 
This laborious activity did, however, have a 
positive spin-off: once details were obtained 
for a municipality, a profile was created on 
SAHA’s requestee database, which is publicly 
accessible on FOIP’s website. This makes the 
submission of future PAIA requests much easier 
for the public.38 However, despite the project’s 
efforts to collect up-to-date contact details and 
submitting PAIA requests to these officials, in 
the end close to 80% of those municipalities 
simply ignored the requests. If a request is not 
responded to within 30 days PAIA automatically 
deems it to have been refused by the requestee 
body. Where requests are deemed refused, or 
are simply ignored, requesters can challenge the 
failure to respond, either through court process 
or, where applicable, through internal appeal.
The FOIP submitted internal appeals against 
these deemed refusals. A small minority of 
municipalities quickly reverted and released the 
records, but the majority failed to respond in 
any way to these appeals. This is particularly 
concerning, as the requests were not only an 
exercise of the right of access to information 
but were also specifically related to the exercise 
of the right to protest – both of which are 
constitutionally enshrined fundamental human 
rights.39 In some instances, even where records 
were released, these were non-compliant in 
terms of the Act. For example, instead of a 
blank template, some municipalities released 
completed notices of gatherings, riddled 
with personal information which they had an 
obligation to redact in terms of sections 34 
and 28 of PAIA. Not only are these records 
unusable as templates but their release also 
demonstrates a complete disregard of the 
mandatory duty to protect the information of 
third parties.40 Municipalities that were made 
aware of these errors rectified their mistakes 
by subsequently releasing blank copies of the 
notice of gathering templates to FOIP instead. 
Another notable issue that came to the fore 
because of the request process was that 
an anomaly was observed in terms of the 
applicability of the RGA. District municipalities, 
as oversight offices, have no responsibilities 
in terms of the RGA. This came to light when 
the FOIP team submitted PAIA requests to 
every district municipality, and the information 
officers of several of those district municipalities 
responded that they did not have the records 
we had requested, as the RGA did not apply to 
them.41 This raises questions around the scope 
of the oversight role of district municipalities. 
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These municipalities arguably have oversight 
of all key issues and functions, and such 
oversight requires access to records related to 
those key issues and functions. It is therefore 
puzzling that district municipalities do not have 
copies of important documents related to key 
issues and functions of local municipalities 
within their districts in their own archives. 
Fortunately, PAIA makes provision for these 
kinds of circumstances. The Act provides that 
the information officer who determines that a 
particular record is not in the possession of the 
public body to which the request was made, 
but with another public body, must transfer 
the PAIA request to such other public body.42 
Information officers of the district municipalities 
were largely responsive to the PAIA requests. 
However, this remains a deficiency in the RGA, 
and ought to be addressed by giving district 
municipalities clear overarching responsibility to 
ensure that the local municipalities within their 
jurisdiction are RGA compliant. This could be 
done both in terms of having notice templates 
available and through their involvement in the 
actual RGA notice procedure – potentially in 
the form of a review of the involvement of local 
municipalities’ responsible officers in section 
4 RGA consultative meetings, or by including 
those municipalities in the meetings.  
Recommendations
While the PAIA request project has yielded 
some victories in terms of the right to protest 
and the right of access to information, the 
project’s activities have exposed serious 
deficiencies in the relevant laws and the 
state’s implementation of these laws. The 
primary finding was that organs of state have 
indeed inherited the ethos of secrecy from 
the apartheid regime, and portray a similar 
resistance to the expression of participatory 
democracy through protest. There ought, 
therefore, to be a push to close any legislative 
gaps that allow the state to avoid its obligations 
to respect, protect and promote the rights in 
sections 17 and 32 of the Constitution. 
We propose the following recommendations to 
enable the realisation of these rights.
Regulation of Gatherings Act
The primary object of the RGA is to facilitate the 
section 17 rights in the Constitution; and with 
the positive obligation on the state to take steps 
to promote and fulfil rights in the Bill of Rights 
as per section 7(2) of the Constitution, there is 
a clear duty on the state to proactively facilitate 
protest. However, the only provision within the 
RGA that requires the state to act proactively is 
section 3(1), which requires responsible officers 
to assist conveners to reduce their notices 
to writing if the conveners are unable to do 
so. Considering the legislative scheme of the 
RGA, which includes notice requirements and 
potential civil and criminal liability, this does little 
to meet the constitutional obligations described 
above. What is missing from the RGA is a clear, 
positive duty on organs of state to be available 
to assist with the notification procedure and to 
respect the legitimate expression of democratic 
participation during the protest itself. 
The spectre of both civil and criminal 
prosecution looms over conveners of protests 
where the protest involves the destruction 
of property, as in Tsoaeli, or where failing to 
satisfy the notice requirements may result in a 
criminal conviction. While the potential for civil 
liability may be a justifiable limitation on the 
rights in section 17, where a protest results in 
destruction of property, it is unlikely that being 
held criminally liable for the mere failure to give 
notice of a peaceful protest will be regarded 
by a court of law as a constitutionally justifiable 
limitation of those rights. This is currently under 
review in a case involving the Social Justice 
Coalition (SJC). In 2015, following a protest 
outside the Cape Town Civic Centre, 10 protest 
conveners representing this organisation were 
convicted for contravening section 12(1)(a) of 
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the RGA for having convened a protest, which 
was peaceful and unarmed, without complying 
with the notice requirements contained in 
section 3.43 This conviction is currently on 
appeal and it has been argued by the appellants 
that section 12(1)(a) is unconstitutional.44 The 
crux of the argument lies in the fact that the 
state needs to be able to demonstrate that 
a limitation of a right (such as the need to 
give notice prior to the exercise of the right to 
protest) is reasonable and justifiable. 
Given that there are means available to the 
state to achieve the purpose of the notice 
provisions – namely that there is an appropriate 
state response that will ensure the safety 
of protesters, the general public and the 
officials involved – that are less restrictive, it 
is unlikely that these provisions will stand up 
to constitutional scrutiny. The depth of the 
limitation of the right is clear; the possibility of 
being jailed for exercising a constitutional right is 
both a deterrent to and grievous consequence 
of legitimate democratic expression, particularly 
where the protest is peaceful.45 
This SJC case highlights a fundamental 
concern that the PAIA requests brought to 
light with respect to the RGA, namely that the 
notice procedure has become an unjustifiable 
obstacle to legitimate democratic expression 
of discontent. This must be remedied. 
How to do so is perhaps less clear, as the 
notice requirement does serve a legitimate 
administrative coordination purpose, and it 
ought not to be done away with completely. At 
a minimum, therefore, the information required 
to comply with notice requirements, such as 
contact details for responsible officers, should 
proactively be made available to the public. The 
RGA should therefore be amended to require 
that this information be recorded and displayed 
at municipal offices and on municipal websites. 
It is further submitted that, along with the 
removal of criminal sanction for non-compliance 
with notice requirements by protesters, provision 
should be made for some form of sanction to 
be applied to officials responsible for facilitating 
protest, in the event that they fail to take 
reasonable steps do so or are obstructive to the 
process (negligently or intentionally). This will 
ensure that the positive duty to respect, protect 
and promote the enjoyment of section 17 is duly 
fulfilled by the functionaries of the state. 
Promotion of Access to Information Act
The intersection between the right to protest 
and the right of access to information has 
brought to light the need for emergency access 
to information provisions to be included in PAIA. 
This is because, as noted above, protests, to 
be effective, often take place at short notice. 
The timeframes within PAIA for the processing 
of requests for information would effectively 
stifle the exercise of the right to protest, if 
information required to protest lawfully needs to 
be accessed using PAIA. There are numerous 
circumstances that may give rise to the need 
to access information at short notice to avoid 
limiting the exercise of a constitutional right. 
Access to medical records to ensure appropriate 
emergency medical care is one such example. 
Parliament should therefore consider making 
provision within PAIA for processing requests 
at shorter notice, where such emergency 
requirements can be demonstrated. 
The poor compliance with PAIA by local 
authorities has highlighted the need for the 
Information Regulator’s Office to be sufficiently 
resourced to provide comprehensive training 
at a local government level. Training needs to 
be focused not only on compliant processing 
of PAIA requests but also on the importance of 
PAIA as legislation giving effect to a right that 
enables the exercise of other rights, be they 
constitutionally enshrined or not. 
In relation to the PAIA requests referred to in this 
article, adequate reasons for refusal of access 
were never provided to SAHA, as is required 
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by section 25 of PAIA. Such adequate reasons 
ought to, in line with section 25 of PAIA, include 
a demonstration as to why grounds for refusal 
provided for in PAIA are applicable to the 
relevant record/s to which access is denied. 
Given the large number of refusals (including 
deemed refusals) of both SAHA’s requests and 
appeals, the only further avenue open to SAHA 
–approaching the courts to obtain relief – was 
too resource intensive to be viable. Another 
available option is to approach the Information 
Regulator, who has the authority to decide on 
this kind of dispute. Currently, however, this 
office functions with only five commissioners 
and no support staff. We therefore recommend 
that Parliament allocate sufficient budget to 
make this office fully functional.
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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